Taler: Usable, privacy-preserving payments for the Web by Burdges, Jeffrey et al.
HAL Id: hal-01398201
https://hal.inria.fr/hal-01398201
Submitted on 16 Nov 2016
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non,
émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de
recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires
publics ou privés.
Taler: Usable, privacy-preserving payments for the Web
Jeffrey Burdges, Florian Dold, Christian Grothoff, Marcello Stanisci
To cite this version:
Jeffrey Burdges, Florian Dold, Christian Grothoff, Marcello Stanisci. Taler: Usable, privacy-preserving
payments for the Web. HotPETS 2016 - Workshop on Hot Topics in Privacy Enhancing Technologies,
Jun 2016, Darmstadt Germany. ￿hal-01398201￿
Taler:
Usable, privacy-preserving payments for the Web
Jeffrey Burdges Florian Dold Christian Grothoff Marcello Stanisci
1. SYSTEM OVERVIEW
Content and services provided on the internet, such
as reading a blog post or sending an email, tend to be
of very small monetary value compared to traditional
financial transactions. Currently the majority of online
offerings are financed via advertisements. Any alterna-
tives must reduce the mental and technical overheads
of existing payment systems to handle micro-payments.
Addressing this problem is urgent because advertising
revenue is declining, and the Big Data business model
where citizens pay with their private information in com-
bination with the deep state hastens our society’s regres-
sion towards post-democracy [3].
Taler is a new electronic online payment system that
provides anonymity for customers. Here, anonymous
simply means that the payment system does not involve
any personal information from the customer, and that
different transactions by the same customer are unlink-
able. For strong anonymity, Taler usually needs to be
used in combination with existing techniques, such as
Tor and [1], to avoid circumstances leaking information
about the customer’s identity. The facts that the user
does not need to authenticate, and that the merchant
thus never learns sensitive personal information about
the customer, improves usability and security: the pay-
ment process is simplified, the merchant’s security re-
quirements are dramatically reduced and the customer’s
risk of identity theft does not accumulate with every
(micro-)payment.
Taler uses blind signatures [2] to create digital coins,
and a novel“refresh”protocol to allow giving change and
refunds while maintaining unlinkability. We will not go
into the details of Taler’s cryptographic protocols here1
and instead focus on the high-level concepts to explain
how the system works from the perspective of customers
1Full documentation at https://api.taler.net/
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Figure 1: Taler system overview.
and merchants in the Taler system (Figure 1).
2. CUSTOMER PERSPECTIVE
In Taler, customers use a wallet to withdraw, hold,
and spend coins. Withdrawing coins requires the cus-
tomer to authenticate and to optionally authorize the
specific transaction, e.g. via a PIN/TAN method as
commonly used by banks. Afterwards, the customer can
anonymously spend their coins by visiting merchants
without having to authenticate for each transaction.
The wallet is implemented as a cross-platform browser
extension. All cryptographic operations and access to
sensitive data are executed in a component that is iso-
lated from websites the user visits.
By necessity, the wallet leaks one bit of information to
websites that the user visits, namely whether the wallet
is installed and activated by the user. Websites can-
not access the customer’s balance or purchase history.
This however also means that all cryptographic tokens
of value are kept locally, and the customer is responsi-
ble for not losing them. Future versions of the wallet
will provide encrypted backups and synchronization be-
tween the wallets of a user.
A common activity for online content is sharing and
bookmarking. Taler specifically provides support to make
this easy for the user. A resource that was purchased is
identified by a unique fulfillment URL for each purchase
of the resource.
Should the session state that allows the user to ac-
cess the content be lost, visiting the fulfillment URL
will transparently restore the session state by transpar-
ently replaying the payment with the same digital value
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Figure 2: Both the customer’s client and the merchant’s server execute sensitive cryptographic operations in a secured
background/backend that is protected against direct access. Interactions between the Taler components (Figure 1)
are not shown. Existing system security mechanisms are used to isolate the cryptographic components (boxes) from
the complex rendering logic of existing Web applications (circles).
tokens from the user’s wallet. Replaying a contract is
only allowed from the domain that the contract origi-
nated from, and thus does not allow arbitrary websites
to obtain information about previous purchases that the
customer made. Sharing the fulfillment URL with a user
that did not pay for the associated digital contract will
result in the expected behavior, namely that they re-
ceiving a new instance of the digital contract with the
opportunity to pay for it.
The case where a user already payed for a resource
and then visits the resource URL (instead of the fulfill-
ment URL) after losing temporary session state is also
handled as expected, since the wallet component will
look for contracts that refer to the same resource.
While Taler is designed to work well with digital re-
sources on the web, it can also be used for more tra-
ditional purchases. The resource that is being payed
for then represents the shopping cart of items that are
being purchased.
3. MERCHANT PERSPECTIVE
A new payment system must also be easy to integrate
and deploy for merchants. Figure 2 shows how the secu-
rity critical payment components of Taler interact with
the logic of existing Web shops. First, the Web shop
front-end is responsible for constructing the shopping
cart. For this, the shop front-end generates the usual
Web pages which are shown to the user’s browser client
front-end. Once the order has been constructed, the
shop front-end gives a proposed contract in JSON format
to the payment backend, which signs it and returns it to
the front-end. The front-end then transfers the signed
contract over the network, and passes it to the wallet.
Here, the wallet operates from a secure background con-
text on the client side, which allows the user to securely
accept the payment, and to perform the cryptographic
operations in a context that is protected from the Web
shop. If the user accepts, the resulting signed coins are
transferred from the client to the server, again by a pro-
tocol that the merchant can customize to fit the existing
infrastructure.
Instead of adding any cryptographic logic to the mer-
chant front-end, the generic Taler merchant backend al-
lows the implementor to delegate handling of the coins
to the payment backend, which validates the coins, de-
posits them at the exchange, and finally validates and
persists the receipt from the exchange. The merchant
backend then communicates the result of the transaction
to the frontend, which is then responsible for executing
the business logic to fulfill the order. As a result of this
setup, the cryptographic details of the Taler protocol
do not have to be re-implemented by each merchant.
Instead, existing Web shops implemented in a multi-
tude of programming languages can rather trivially add
support for Taler by (1) upon request, generating a con-
tract in JSON based on the shopping cart, (2) allowing
the backend to sign the contract before sending it to
the client, (7) passing coins received in payment for a
contract to the backend and (8) executing fulfillment
business logic if the backend confirms the validity of the
payment.
To setup a Taler backend, the merchant only needs
to configure it with the respective wire transfer rout-
ing details, such as an IBAN number. The customer’s
authentication of the Web shop continues to rely upon
HTTPS/X.509.
4. CONCLUSION
We encourage everyone to try our prototype for Taler
at https://demo.taler.net/.
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